Second presidency of Nicolás Maduro

The second presidency of Nicolás Maduro (2019-2025) represents the fifth governmental period in Venezuela under the Bolivarian Revolution. It began amidst a 68% voter abstention rate[1] and concluded with allegations of electoral fraud, with Maduro assuming an early start to what would be his third term.[2]

The foreign policy of Maduro's second term has been characterized by the severance of diplomatic relations with Argentina, Bolivia (restored in 2020),[3] Brazil (restored in 2022),[4] Colombia (restored in 2022),[5] El Salvador, the United States,[6] Guatemala[7] and Paraguay.

Domestic policy

Defense

In 2023, Nicolás Maduro conducted a significant reshuffling of the Venezuelan military high command, retiring the general commanders of all branches: the Army, Military Aviation, National Guard, and Navy, as well as the commanders of the civilian-military Bolivarian Militia, the Integrated Aerospace Defense Command (Codai), and the Inspector General of the Armed Forces.[8]

In May 2024, it was announced that one million members of the Bolivarian Militia would undergo weapons training.[9]

Media policy

In 2019, several international news channels were taken off the air in Venezuela, including Canal 24 Horas, TV Chile, Antena 3, National Geographic, CNN, BBC, Telearuba, and TeleCuraçao. Between 2021 and 2022, the National Commission of Telecommunications (Conatel) blocked 45 news websites. The Inter American Press Association has condemned these actions as a "gag on independent journalism."[10][11] In 2023, TBS and TruTV also ceased broadcasting in the country. Following a report on corruption in Venezuela, the German broadcaster Deutsche Welle was taken off the air in March 2024, with President Maduro criticizing the outlet as "Nazi."[12]

According to the Chapultepec Index by the Inter American Press Association, Venezuela was ranked last (#22) in the index of freedom of expression and the press in the Americas for both 2020 and 2021, receiving the classification of a country "without freedom of expression." The country rose to the #21 position in 2022 and remained there in 2023, still with the classification of "without freedom of expression."[13][14]

Foreign policy

The foreign policy of Maduro's second term has been characterized by the continuation of alliances with Cuba, Nicaragua, Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey,[7] alongside the severance of diplomatic relations with Argentina, Bolivia (restored in 2020),[3] Brazil (restored in 2022),[4] Colombia (restored in 2022),[5] El Salvador, the United States,[6] Guatemala[7] and Paraguay.

United States of America

Proposed United States invasion of Venezuela

These paragraphs are an excerpt from Proposed United States invasion of Venezuela.[edit]
During both the first and second United States presidency of Donald Trump, the possibility of a United States–led invasion of Venezuela was discussed.[15][16][17]

International organizations

International Criminal Court investigation

This section is an excerpt from International Criminal Court investigation in Venezuela.[edit]
An investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to analyze possible crimes against humanity committed in Venezuela was opened in 2021.[18] A preliminary examination was initially opened in 2006, and closed after concluding that the requirements to start an investigation had not been met.[19] In February 2018, the ICC announced that it would open preliminary probes into alleged crimes against humanity performed by Venezuelan authorities since at least April 2017.[20] In 2020, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC stated that it believed there was a "reasonable basis" to believe that "since at least April 2017, civilian authorities, members of the armed forces and pro-government individuals have committed the crimes against humanity",[21] and on 2021 ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan announced the opening of an investigation regarding the situation in the country.[18]

Opposition

Presidential crisis

This section is an excerpt from Venezuelan presidential crisis.[edit]

The Venezuelan presidential crisis was a political crisis concerning the leadership and the legitimate president of Venezuela between 2019 and 2023, with the nation and the world divided in support for Nicolás Maduro or Juan Guaidó.

Venezuela is engulfed in a political and economic crisis which has led to more than seven million people leaving the country since 2015. The process and results of the 2018 presidential elections were widely disputed.[22][23] The opposition-majority National Assembly declared Maduro a usurper of the presidency on the day of his second inauguration and disclosed a plan to set forth its president Guaidó as the succeeding acting president of the country under article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution.[23][24] A week later, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice declared that the presidency of the National Assembly was the "usurper" of authority and declared the body to be unconstitutional.[23] Minutes after Maduro took the oath as president, the Organization of American States (OAS) approved a resolution in a special session of its Permanent Council declaring Maduro's presidency illegitimate and urging new elections.[25] Special meetings of the OAS on 24 January and in the United Nations Security Council on 26 January were held but no consensus was reached. Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres called for dialogue.[26] During the 49th General Assembly of the Organization of American States on 27 June, Guaidó's presidency was recognized by the organization.[27] Guaidó and the National Assembly declared he was acting president and swore himself in on 23 January.[28]

At his peak, Guaidó was recognized as legitimate by about 60 countries, despite never running as president; Maduro by about 20 countries.[29][30][31] However, Guaidó's international support waned over time.[32] Internationally, support followed geopolitical lines, with Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Turkey supporting Maduro, while the majority of Western and Latin American countries supported Guaidó as acting president.[29][33][34] Support for Guaidó began to decline when a military uprising attempt in April 2019 failed to materialize.[35][36] Following the failed uprising, representatives of Guaidó and Maduro began mediation, with the assistance of the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution.[37] After the second meeting in Norway, no deal was reached.[38] In July 2019, negotiations started again in Barbados with representatives from both sides.[39][40][41] In September, Guaidó announced the end of dialogue following a forty-day absence by the Maduro government as a protest against the recent sanctions by the United States. In March 2020, the United States proposed a transitional government that would exclude both Maduro and Guaidó from the presidency.[42] U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that sanctions did not apply to humanitarian aid during the coronavirus pandemic health emergency and that the United States would lift all sanctions if Maduro agreed to organize elections that did not include himself.[43] Guaidó accepted the proposal,[44] while Venezuela's foreign minister, Jorge Arreaza, rejected it.[45]

By January 2020, efforts led by Guaidó to create a transitional government had been unsuccessful and Maduro continued to control Venezuela's state institutions.[46][47][48] In January 2021, the European Union stopped recognizing Guaidó as president, but still did not recognize Maduro as the legitimate president;[49] the European Parliament reaffirmed its recognition of Guaidó as president,[50][51] and the EU threatened with further sanctions.[49] After the announcement of regional elections in 2021, Guaidó announced a "national salvation agreement" and proposed the negotiation with Maduro with a schedule for free and fair elections, with international support and observers, in exchange for lifting international sanctions.[52]

In December 2022, three of the four main opposition political parties (Justice First, Democratic Action and A New Era) backed and approved a reform to dissolve the interim government and create a commission of five members to manage foreign assets, as deputies sought a united strategy ahead of the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election,[53][54] stating that the interim government had failed to achieve the goals it had set.[55]

2019 Venezuelan protests

This section is an excerpt from 2019 Venezuelan protests.[edit]

The 2019 Venezuelan protests were a collection of protests that were organized, since 11 January, as a coordinated effort to remove Nicolás Maduro from the presidency. Demonstrations began following Maduro's controversial second inauguration, developing into a presidential crisis between Maduro and National Assembly president Juan Guaidó. The protests also included counter-demonstrations organized by those who support Maduro.

The protests partially resumed early in 2020, but were suspended due to the arrival of COVID-19 to Venezuela.

2019 Venezuelan uprising attempt

This paragraph is an excerpt from 2019 Venezuelan uprising attempt.[edit]
On 30 April 2019, during the Venezuelan presidential crisis, a group of several dozen military personnel[56] and civilians joined Juan Guaidó in his call for the removal of Nicolás Maduro as part of what he labeled "Operation Freedom" (Spanish: Operación Libertad). Reuters reported an "uneasy peace" by the afternoon of 30 April.[56] During the unrest, opposition leader Leopoldo López was freed from house arrest after being imprisoned for five years.[57] Manuel Cristopher Figuera, the head of the Bolivarian Intelligence Service, denounced the Maduro government and was dismissed from his position[58] before going into hiding.[59] At least 25 military men who opposed Maduro sought asylum at the Brazilian embassy in Caracas.[60]

2022 Venezuelan recall referendum project

This section is an excerpt from 2022 Venezuelan recall referendum project.[edit]
On 26 January 2022, the Venezuelan opposition promoted a recall referendum against the Nicolás Maduro government. The National Electoral Council ordered the collection of the required signatures, 20% of the electoral registry, to be carried out in a single day, the equivalent of having to collect four million signatures in twelve hours, which resulted in not reaching the required signatures, the referendum being declared inadmissible and making it impossible to summon for another recall for Maduro's second presidential term.[61]

2024 Venezuelan presidential election protests

This section is an excerpt from 2024 Venezuelan presidential election protests.[edit]


Protests followed the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election on 28 July, in response to voter fraud and other irregularities during the election cycle, as part of the 2024 Venezuelan political crisis. The election and unrest occurred in the context of the ongoing crisis in Venezuela.

Statistical analyses by multiple organizations[62] indicated that the election was won convincingly by Edmundo Gonzalez but those results have not been recognized by incumbent Nicolás Maduro; the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), an alliance of opposition parties, released vote tallies at the precinct level indicating that González won by a wide margin, while the government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) announced an unsubstantiated result, without any precinct-level tallies, stating Maduro won. Both candidates claimed victory, while many countries recognized González as the winner.

Demonstrations to uphold the results of the election, along with vigils for political prisoners, occurred worldwide after the July election. Spontaneous protests broke out immediately after the election, while later rallies were organized by the Venezuelan opposition;[63] Maduro claimed the opposition was encouraging a coup and has charged demonstraters with terrorism, while initiating an unprecedented crackdown.[64] Maduro's security forces have gone door-to-door seeking to arrest protesters, poll workers and members of the opposition in what Maduro has referred to as Operation Tun Tun, and armed bands of Maduro supporters known as colectivos have joined security forces in repressing dissent. As of 14 August 2024, at least 2,200 persons are reported to have been arrested, and 25 killed;[65] Maduro has announced plans to continue to seek the arrest of dissenters, and to rehabilitate two prisons to house those detained.

The repression has been widely condemned by international groups; Amnesty International penned an open letter requesting urgent action from the International Criminal Court (ICC),[66] on the basis of an ongoing ICC investigation of possible crimes against humanity under Maduro's regime.

See also

References

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  2. ^ "La comunidad internacional no reconoce la victoria de Maduro en Venezuela y pide "que se cuente cada voto"". 20minutos.es (in Spanish). 2024-07-29.
  3. ^ a b "Gobierno de Bolivia restablece relaciones con Venezuela". Deutsche Welle (in Spanish). 12 November 2020.
  4. ^ a b "Brasil restablecerá relaciones con Venezuela a partir del 1 de enero". Swissinfo (in Spanish). 2022-12-14.
  5. ^ a b "Maduro recibe al embajador de Colombia en Caracas, marcando el restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas entre ambos países" (in Spanish). BBC News Mundo. 2022.
  6. ^ a b "Nicolás Maduro: "He decidido romper relaciones diplomáticas con Estados Unidos"". Infobae (in Spanish). 2019-01-23.
  7. ^ a b c "Venezuela y su puente "casi quebrado" en relaciones con América Latina". Forbes (in Spanish). 2020-01-17.
  8. ^ Barráez, Sebastiana (2023-07-07). "Nicolás Maduro pasa a retiro a casi todo el Alto Mando Militar". Infobae (in Spanish).
  9. ^ "Más de 1 millón de venezolanos recibieron adiestramiento en armas dentro de la Milicia". El Nacional (in Spanish). 20 May 2024.
  10. ^ "La SIP denunció el cierre de medios en Venezuela: "Dejó de existir el periodismo independiente en el país"". Infobae (in Spanish). 2022-10-30.
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  13. ^ "Libertad de prensa cae al más bajo nivel en América Latina". Deutsche Welle (in Spanish). 10 November 2023.
  14. ^ "Índice Chapultepec de Libertad de Expresión y Prensa" (PDF). Índice Chapultepec (in Spanish).
  15. ^ "El día que Donald Trump sugirió a sus asesores invadir Venezuela". Clarín. August 6, 2018.
  16. ^ "US Plotted 'Terrifying' Venezuela Invasion with Opposition's Blessing". 16 May 2022.
  17. ^ "With Trump's Re-Election, A Venezuela Invasion Could be on the Cards". 12 December 2024.
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  20. ^ "Situations & Cases - Overview". International Criminal Court Project. 2022-03-22. Retrieved 2022-03-22.
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  22. ^ Cite error: The named reference Venezuelan presidential crisis BriefingNYT was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  23. ^ a b c Cite error: The named reference Venezuelan presidential crisis bbc.com was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  24. ^ "Prensa de la AN rectifica comunicado que proclama a Juan Guaidó Presidente de la República". Efecto Cocuyo. 11 January 2019. Archived from the original on 2 July 2019. Retrieved 12 January 2019.
  25. ^ "La OEA aprobó la resolución que declara ilegítimo al nuevo gobierno de Nicolás Maduro" [The OAS approved the resolution that declared the new government of Nicolás Maduro illegitimate]. Infobae (in Spanish). 10 January 2019.
  26. ^ "UN political chief calls for dialogue to ease tensions in Venezuela; Security Council divided over path to end crisis". UN News. 26 January 2019. Retrieved 29 January 2019.
  27. ^ "México, Uruguay, Bolivia y Nicaragua respaldaron al régimen de Maduro e intentaron desplazar al enviado de Guaidó de la Asamblea de la OEA". Infobae (in Spanish). EFE. 27 June 2019. Si se convalidan las credenciales (por las del enviado de Guaidó) se reconoce un nuevo gobierno de Venezuela y Uruguay eso no lo puede aceptar
  28. ^ Cite error: The named reference Venezuelan presidential crisis GuaidoSwears was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  29. ^ a b "More dollars and fewer protests in Venezuela". The Economist. 2019-12-18. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 2019-12-27. Most Western and Latin American countries recognise Mr Guaidó's claim
  30. ^ "Troops that revolted against Venezuela's Maduro have fled the country". NBC News. 9 December 2019. Retrieved 2019-12-27. National Assembly President Juan Guaidó, who is recognized as Venezuela's rightful leader by the U.S. and some 60 countries
  31. ^ "Venezuelan gov't, opposition blame each other for blackouts". EFE. Retrieved 2019-12-27. Juan Guaido, acknowledged as interim president of Venezuela by some 60 countries
  32. ^ Lawler, Dave (2023-01-04). "U.S. no longer recognizes Guaidó as Venezuela's president, Biden official confirms". Axios. Retrieved 2023-01-05.
  33. ^ Vasilyeva, Nataliya (24 January 2019). "Venezuela crisis: Familiar geopolitical sides take shape". Associated Press. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
  34. ^ "Maduro isolated as Latin American nations back Venezuela opposition leader". Reuters. 24 January 2019. Retrieved 22 December 2019.
  35. ^ *Rodríguez, Jesús A (8 May 2019). "We are going to take over the premises". Politico. Retrieved 10 May 2019. In Venezuela, though the number of people who say they recognize Guaidó as the legitimate president has dwindled to about 50 percent since January, his approval remains much stronger than Maduro's abysmal 4 percent.
    • Wyss, Jim (6 May 2019). "As Guaido's popularity in Venezuela begins to dwindle, what's next for the opposition?". Miami Herald. Chicago Tribune. Archived from the original on 10 May 2019. Retrieved 10 May 2019. ... last week's failed military uprising and a spate of violent but fruitless demonstrations have some wondering if Guaido, and the opposition at large, have what it takes to oust Maduro ... A poll released Monday by Caracas-based Meganalisis found that Guaido's approval ratings dropped to 50 percent, down from 84 percent in January. He's still far more popular than Maduro whose approval rating is at 4 percent but the precipitous drop can't be ignored ...
    • Casoni, Giampiero (7 May 2019). "Venezuela, il gradimento di Guaidò cala a picco: meno 34% in soli tre mesi". Ci Siamo (in Italian). Archived from the original on 10 May 2019. Retrieved 10 May 2019. The popularity of Juan Guaidò is in sharp decline and the 'liberator' of Venezuela seems to have exhausted the original propulsive thrust ... At the center of this drop in consensus, especially the failure (because of its failure) of the coup in recent weeks ...
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  39. ^ "Oposición y oficialismo retoman negociaciones en Barbados". Voz de América (in Spanish). 9 July 2019. Retrieved 12 July 2019.
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  41. ^ vuelta -, ALnavío-Noticias de ida y. "Cómo el informe Bachelet presiona las negociaciones de Guaidó y Maduro en Barbados". ALnavío – Noticias de ida y vuelta - (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 3 June 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2019.
  42. ^ Faiola, Anthony; Morello, Carol (31 March 2020). "U.S. proposes transitional government for Venezuela, without Maduro or Guaidó". Washington Post. Retrieved 31 March 2020.
  43. ^ "Mike Pompeo dijo que EEUU levantará las sanciones a Venezuela si el chavismo acepta ir a elecciones libres" [Mike Pompeo said that the US will lift sanctions against Venezuela if Chavismo agrees to go to free elections]. Infobae Mexico (in Spanish). March 31, 2020.
  44. ^ "Guaidó acepta el gobierno de transición que propone EEUU". Atlántico (in Spanish). 1 April 2020.
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  47. ^ "Venezuela: Rival rallies held as Guaido calls for daily protests". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2019-12-04.
  48. ^ "'Missed his moment': opposition corruption scandal undermines Venezuela's Guaido". Reuters. 2019-12-03. Retrieved 2019-12-04.
  49. ^ a b Emmott, Robin (2021-01-06). "EU no longer acknowledges Venezuela's Guaido as interim president". Reuters. Retrieved 2021-01-07.
  50. ^ "MEPs: Juan Guaidó is the legitimate interim President of Venezuela". European Parliament. 2021-01-21. Retrieved 2023-01-21.
  51. ^ "Juan Guaidó remains legitimate interim president, according to European Parliament". Agence Europe. Retrieved 2023-01-21.
  52. ^ "Juan Guaidó abre la puerta a la negociación con Nicolás Maduro al invocar un acuerdo de salvación nacional". El Mundo. 2021-05-11. Retrieved 2021-05-14.
  53. ^ Armas, Mayela (2022-12-31). "Venezuela opposition removes interim President Guaido". Reuters. Retrieved 2022-12-31.
  54. ^ Martínez, Deisy (2022-12-30). "AN de 2015 aprueba su extensión por otro año y elimina gobierno interino" [2015 NA approves its extension for one more year and eliminates interim government]. Efecto Cocuyo (in Spanish). Retrieved 2022-12-31.
  55. ^ "Mayoría de la AN-2015 ratifica disolución del Gobierno interino". Tal Cual (in Spanish). 2022-12-30. Retrieved 2022-12-31. Hemos tenido algo que pasó de ser provisional a convertirse en algo perpetuo. Y no se celebraron las elecciones, de manera que el artículo 233 perdió su razón de ser para justificar el gobierno interino.
  56. ^ a b Sequera, Vivian and Angus Berwick (30 April 2019). "Venezuela's Guaido calls on troops to join him in uprising against Maduro". Reuters. Retrieved 30 April 2019.
  57. ^ "Leopoldo López y su familia ingresaron como huéspedes a la residencia del embajador de Chile". La Patilla (in European Spanish). 30 April 2019. Retrieved 30 April 2019.
  58. ^ Nicolás Maduro destituyó a Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera, director del Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia, que denunció la corrupción del régimen. Publicado el 1 de mayo de 2019. Consultado el 1 de mayo de 2019.
  59. ^ "Tras escapar de Maduro, exjefe del Sebin revela quienes se niegan a dejar el poder". NTN24 (in Spanish). 5 May 2019. Retrieved 6 May 2019.
  60. ^ "Unos 25 militares venezolanos piden asilo en la embajada de Brasil en Caracas". El Comercio. 30 April 2019. Retrieved 7 May 2019.
  61. ^ Moleiro, Alonso; Singer, Florantonia (2022-01-25). "La inviable activación del revocatorio contra Nicolás Maduro". El País. Retrieved 2022-01-26.
  62. ^ Amaya, Sol; Jiménez, Sebastián; Raza, Jhasua (9 August 2024). "After Venezuela's contested presidential vote, experts say government results are a 'statistical improbability'". CNN. Retrieved 13 August 2024.
  63. ^ "Venezuela opposition leader Machado vows to make Maduro 'yield' on election 'fraud'". France 24. 28 August 2024.
  64. ^ Phillips, Tom; Torres, Patricia (3 August 2024). "'Maduro has lost the streets': In Venezuela's barrios, former loyal voters risk all in protests". The Guardian. The Observer.
  65. ^ Delgado, Antonio Maria; Ortiz Blanes, Syra (14 August 2024). "A hundred thousand Venezuelans are considering leaving the country right now, poll says". Miami Herald. Yahoo News.
  66. ^ "Open letter to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: Urgent call for action on Venezuela" (PDF). Amnesty International. 9 August 2024.
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