Mahmud Barzanji
Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji شێخ مهحموود | |
---|---|
Şêx Mehmûdê Berzencî Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji[1] | |
Governor of Sanjak of Duhok Governorate | |
Reign | 1911 - 1918 |
Predecessor | Unknown |
Successor | Unknown |
Ruler of Kurdistan | |
Reign | 25 October 1918 - 28 June 1919 |
Predecessor | Office established |
Successor | Office abolished |
King of Kurdistan[2] | |
Reign | September 1921 - July 1925 |
Predecessor | Office established |
Successor | Office abolished |
Born | 1878 Sulaymaniyah, Mosul Vilayet, Ottoman Iraq, Ottoman Empire |
Died | 9 October 1956 Baghdad, Iraq | (aged 77–78)
Burial | Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq |
Issue | Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmood (son, 1912–1996) Latif Hafid al-Barzanji (son, 1915-1972) |
Rebellious leader | |
Allegiance | Azadî - Society for the Rise of Kurdistan |
Branch | Barzanji Battalion |
Battles / wars |
Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, also known as Mahmud Hafid Zadeh (1878 – October 9, 1956), was a Kurdish nationalist and islamist leader of a series of Kurdish uprisings against the British Mandate of Iraq.[3] He was sheikh of a Qadiriyah Sufi family of the Barzanji clan from the city of Sulaymaniyah, which is now in Kurdistan Region. He was named King of Kurdistan during several of these uprisings.[3]
When the British Mandate of Mesopotamia was established in what is now Iraq after World War I, the British sought a suitable means of governing the Kurdish north. In 1918, following the tribal government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of what is now Pakistan, then part of British India, the British appointed Barzaniji as governor over the Kurds in Sulaimaniyah.[4] However, the determination of Barzanji was not in the interests of all Kurds, as the rivalry between tribes and orders was great.[5]
Mahmud Barzanji revolts were a series of armed uprisings against the British forces in the newly conquered Mesopotamia and later the British Mandate in Iraq. Following his first insurrection in May 1919, Sheykh Mahmud was imprisoned and eventually exiled to India for a one-year period. When he returned he was once again appointed a governor, but shortly afterwards revolted again and declared himself the ruler of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The Kingdom of Kurdistan lasted from September 1922 – 1924. With British forces greatly exceeding his in ammunition and training, Barzanji was finally subdued and the region reverted to central British Iraqi rule in 1924. Sheykh Mahmud retreated into the mountains, and eventually reached terms with the independent Kingdom of Iraq in 1932, over his return from the underground. Shaykh Mahmud revolts are considered the first chapter of the modern Iraqi–Kurdish conflict.
Early life
Mahmud Barzanji was born 1878 in Sulaymaniyah as the son of parents originally from the nearby village of Barzinjah who belonged to the Barzanji clan.[6] Barzanji‘s family also were Sufi Qadiriyya, of which he later became sheikh.[7] His grandfather was Haji Kaka Ahmad, who was a notable Kurdish cleric who was known for his donations of food to the needy, his grave is located in the Great Mosque of Sulaymaniyah.[8] Barzanji was a direct descendant of a brother of Sultan Sahak, the founder of Yarsanism,[9] and of the Kurdish poet and scholar Marif Nodeyi.[10]
Educated in religious sciences and Sufi doctrine, he inherited both spiritual authority and social influence, which laid the foundation for his later political ambitions. His upbringing in a religious household with deep tribal connections allowed him to navigate both spiritual and secular spheres of influence. By the late 19th and early 20th century, Mahmud had already gained a reputation as a respected religious figure, with a growing number of followers and allies among Kurdish tribal leaders. His early exposure to Ottoman administrative structures, local governance, and the weakening of central authority after World War I positioned him to play a decisive role in the political vacuum that followed.[11]
Mahmud reportedly had a close mentorship relationship with his uncle who was a prominent Ottoman religious scholar, Sheikh Muhammad al-Barzanji, and was known for advocating Kurdish cultural identity within an Islamic framework. This mentorship influenced Mahmud’s blending of Kurdish nationalism with religious authority.[12]
He had close relations with Kurdish poets like Nari or Qani.[13]
Additionally, some Kurdish oral traditions recount that Mahmud was initially reluctant to pursue a political path and preferred a quiet religious life. However, the turmoil following World War I and pressure from tribal leaders and British authorities compelled him to take a more active political role—transforming from a spiritual figure into a national leader.[12]
Sheikh Mahmud was known as to be the most influential personality in “southern Kurdistan”[14] and was also appointed Governor of the former sanjak of Duhok from 1911 to 1919.[15]
Political commitment
First struggles with Ottoman politics
The Kurdish nationalist struggle first emerged in the late 19th century when a unified movement demanded the establishment of a Kurdish state. Revolts occurred sporadically, but only decades after the Ottoman centralist policies of the 19th century began did the first modern Kurdish nationalist movement emerge with an uprising led by a Kurdish landowner and head of the powerful Shamdinan family, Sheikh Ubeydullah.[16] In 1880 Ubeydullah demanded political autonomy or outright independence for Kurds and the recognition of a Kurdistan state without interference from Turkish or Persian authorities."[17] The uprising against Qajar Persia and the Ottoman Empire was ultimately suppressed by the Ottomans, and Ubeydullah, along with Sheikh Mahmud and other notables, was exiled to Istanbul.[5] After World War I, the British and other Western powers occupied parts of the Ottoman Empire. Plans made with the French in the Sykes–Picot Agreement designated Britain as the mandate power.[18] The British were able to form their own borders to their pleasure to gain an advantage in this region.[19] The British had firm control of Baghdad and Basra and the regions around these cities mostly consisted of Shiite and Sunni Arabs.[20] Western powers (particularly the United Kingdom) fighting the Turks promised the Kurdish tribal leaders (under them Sheikh Mahmud) that they would act as guarantors for Kurdish freedom,[4] a promise they subsequently broke.[20] One particular organization, the Society for the Elevation of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti) was central to the forging of a distinct Kurdish identity. It took advantage of period of political liberalization in during the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1920) of Turkey to transform a renewed interest in Kurdish culture and language into a political Kurdish nationalist movement based on ethnicity.[5] Around the start of the 20th century Russian anthropologists encouraged this emphasis on Kurds as a distinct ethnicity from the Arabs, suggesting that the Kurds were a European race (compared to the Asiatic Turks) based on physical characteristics and on the Kurdish language (which forms part of the Indo-European language-group).[21] While these researchers had ulterior political motives (to sow dissent in the Ottoman Empire) their findings were embraced and still accepted today by many.[22][23]
Strivings for an independent Kurdish state
In 1921, the British appointed Faisal I the King of Iraq. It was an interesting choice because Faisal had no local connections, as he was part of the Hashemite family in Western Arabia.[24] As events were unfolding in the southern part of Iraq, the British were also developing new policies in northern Iraq, which was primarily inhabited by Kurds, and was known as Greater Kurdistan in the Paris (Versailles) Peace Conference of 1919. The borders that the British formed had the Kurds between central Iraq (Baghdad) and the Ottoman lands of the north.
The Kurdish people of Iraq lived in the mountainous and terrain of the Mosul Vilayet. It was a difficult region to control from the British perspective because of the terrain and tribal loyalties of the Kurds. There was much conflict after the Great War between the Ottoman government and British on how the borders should be established. The Ottomans were unhappy with the outcome of the Treaty of Sèvres, which allowed the Great War victors control over much of the former Ottoman lands through the distribution of formerly Ottoman territory as League of Nations mandates.
In particular, the Turks felt that the Mosul Vilayet was theirs because the British had illegally conquered it after the Mudros Armistice, which had ended hostilities in the war.[25] With the discovery of oil in northern Iraq, the British were unwilling to relinquish the Mosul Vilayet.[26] Also, it was to the British advantage to have the Kurds play a buffer role between themselves and the Ottoman Empire. All that led to the importance of Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji.
The British government promised the Kurds during the First World War that they would receive their own land to form a Kurdish state. However, the British government did not keep their promise at the end of the war, leading to resentment among the Kurds.[27] There was mistrust on the part of the Kurds. In 1919, uneasiness began to evolve in the Kurdish regions because they were unhappy with their current situation and in their dealings with the British government. The Kurds revolted a year later.
The British government attempted to establish a Kurdish protectorate in the region and so appointed a popular leader of the region,[28] which was how Mahmud became governor of southern Kurdistan.
Mahmud was a very ambitious Kurdish national leader and promoted the idea of Kurds controlling their own state and gaining independence from the British. As Charles Tripp relates, the British appointed him governor of Sulaimaniah in southern Kurdistan as a way of gaining an indirect rule in this region. The British wanted this indirect rule with the popular Mahmud at the helm, which they believed would give them a face and a leader to control and calm the region. However, with a little taste of power, Mahmud had ambitions for more for himself and for the Kurdish people. He was declared "King of Kurdistan" and claimed to be the ruler of all Kurds, but the opinion of Mahmud among Kurds was mixed because he was becoming too powerful and ambitious for some.[29]
Mahmud hoped to create Kurdistan and initially the British allowed Mahmud to pursue has ambitions because he was bringing the region and people together under indirect British control. However, by 1920 Mahmud, to British displeasure, was using his power against the British by arresting British officials in the Kurd region and starting uprisings against the British.[30] As historian Kevin McKierman writes, "The rebellion lasted until Mahmud was wounded in combat, which occurred on the road between Kirkuk and Sulaimaniah. Captured by British forces, he was sentenced to death but later imprisoned in a British fort in Lahore."[31] Mahmud remained in India until 1922.
Rise to power
First revolt (1918-1919)
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in October 1918, Barzanji sought to break away from the Ottomans and create an autonomous southern Kurdistan under British supervision. He was elected as the head of government by a council of Kurdish notables in the Sulaimaniya region, and as soon as the British captured Kirkuk (25 October 1918[32]) he captured Ottoman troops present in his district and declared the end of Ottoman rule, pledging allegiance to Britain. Other Kurdish regions followed suit, such as Rania and Keuisenjaq.[33]
Tribal fighters from both Iran and Iraq quickly allied themselves with Sheikh Mahmud as he became more successful in opposing British rule. According to McDowall, the Shaykh's forces "were largely Barzinja tenantry and tribesmen, the Hamavand under Karim Fattah Beg, and disaffected sections of the Jaf, Jabbari, Sheikh Bizayni and Shuan tribes".[34] The popularity and numbers of Sheikh Mahmud's troops only increased after their ambush of a British military column.
The Ottoman position was that the region was still legally under their rule, despite the armistice. (Further information: Mosul Question) They did not recognize the Kurdish state. In contrast, British officials on the ground chose to accept Kurdish cooperation, despite officially lacking a well-defined policy on southern Kurdistan.[33]
Among Mahmud's many supporters and troop leaders was 16-year-old Mustafa Barzani, the future leader of the Kurdish nationalist cause and commander of Peshmerga forces in Kurdish Iraq. Barzani and his men, following the orders of Barzani tribal sheikh Ahmed Barzani, traversed the Piyaw Valley on their way to join Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji. Despite being ambushed numerous times along the way, Barzani and his men reached Sheikh Mahmud's location, albeit too late to aid in the revolt.
Mahmud Barzanji was designated by the British as governor of Kurdish area B, which extended from south of the Lesser Zab River to the old Ottoman-Persian frontier.[35] Barzanji attempted to expand his influence outside his designated region, and used British subsidies, provided for salaries and to assist recovery from the ravages of war, in order to consolidate his power base, buying the loyalty of chieftains.[35] This led to deteriorating relations with the British, setting the stage for an eventual revolt.[35]
On 23 May 1919, a few months after being appointed governor of Sulaymaniyah, Barzanji raised 300 tribal fighters, expelled British supervisors and proclaimed himself "Ruler of all Kurdistan", initiating the first of the Mahmud Barzanji revolts.[36] Early in the rebellion, the Kurds saw some success with the successful ambush of a light British column that strayed beyond Chamchamal. On both sides of the border, tribes proclaimed themselves for Shaykh Mahmud.[36]
British involvement was restricted to a role of supervision, and the local government retained autonomy in regards to matters relating to judiciary and revenue.[37] Edward Noel was appointed by Arnold Wilson as political officer responsible for supervision.[37]
Tribal fighters from both Iran and Iraq quickly allied themselves with Sheykh Mahmud as he became more successful in opposing British rule. According to McDowall, the Sheykh's forces "were largely Barzinja tenantry and tribesmen, the Hamavand under Karim Fattah Beg, and disaffected sections of the Jaf, Jabbari, Sheykh Bizayni and Shuan tribes".[38]
Among the supporters of Sheykh Mahmud was also the 16-year-old Mustafa Barzani, who was to become the future leader of the Kurdish nationalist cause and a commander of the Peshmerga forces. Barzani and his men, following the orders of Barzani tribal Shekyh Ahmed Barzani, crossed the Piyaw Valley to join Sheykh Mahmud Barzanji. Even though they were ambushed several times on the way, Barzani and his men managed to reach Sheykh Mahmud's location, however were too late to aid the revolt.[39] The Barzani fighters were only a part of the Sheykh's 500-person force.
As the British became aware of the sheykh's growing political and military power, they were forced to respond militarily, and two brigades defeated the 500-strong Kurdish force in the Bazyan Pass[36] on 18 June, and occupied Halabja on the 28th, ending the Kurdish state and defeating the rebellion.[40][41]
Turkish historian Ilhan Kilic states that the government "raised the Kurdish flag" upon rebellion on 23 May 1919, though he does not provide any details about its design.[42] However, the authors of From Enemies to Allies: Turkey and Britain, 1918–1960go in more detail about its design, stating "The flag designed in 1919 was green with a red circle and white crescent inside the circle."[43] flaglog.com, an online index of flags, likewise corroborates that "Mahmud Barzanji revolted against the British under a green Kurdish flag. The revolt was suppressed in June but Barzanji would return in 1921 to declare an unrecognized Kingdom of Kurdistan under the same flag."[44]
Sheykh Mahmud Barzanji was arrested and sent into exile to India in 1919.[39]
Final revolt and exile
With the exile of the Sheikh in India, Turkish nationalists in the crumbling Ottoman Empire were causing a great deal of trouble in the Kurdish regions of Iraq. The Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal, were riding high in the early 1920s after their victory against Greece and were looking to take that momentum into Iraq and take back Mosul which began the Mosul question. With the British in direct control of northern Iraq after the exile of Sheikh Mahmud, the area was becoming increasingly hostile for the British officials due to the threat from Turkey. The region was led by the Sheikh's brother, Sheikh Qadir, who was not capable of handling the situation and was seen by the British as an unstable and unreliable leader.
One often overlooked aspect of Mahmud Barzanji’s final revolt was the significant role of intra-Kurdish dissent and betrayal. Several influential Kurdish tribal leaders initially allied with Barzanji but defected during the conflict, either due to personal rivalries or British incentives, weakening his cause substantially.[45] These internal fractures were not simply tactical but rooted in long-standing local disputes and differing visions of Kurdish autonomy.[46]
Barzanji’s revolt also involved a relatively sophisticated use of propaganda and religious symbolism to rally support, including issuing fatwas declaring the British mandate illegitimate and framing his uprising as a jihad.[47] These efforts extended to the use of poetry and sermons that circulated widely, yet such cultural mobilization has rarely been examined in detail in historical accounts.[47]
Another little-known fact is that during his exile, Barzanji maintained secret communications with Kurdish guerrilla groups still active in the mountains, providing moral and strategic guidance despite restrictions imposed by the British. This underground network contributed to continued low-level resistance and kept the spirit of rebellion alive.
Furthermore, Barzanji’s exile experience included a period of enforced intellectual isolation, where British authorities confiscated much of his correspondence and writings.[48] This censorship hampered his ability to influence Kurdish politics, a tactic reflecting the colonial power’s awareness of his ideological influence beyond mere military leadership.[48]
Sir Percy Cox, a British military official and administrator to the Middle East especially Iraq, and Winston Churchill, a British politician, were at odds on whether to release the Sheikh from his exile and bring him back to reign in northern Iraq. That would allow the British to have better control over the hostile but important region. Cox argued that the British could gain authority in a region they recently evacuated, and the Sheikh was the only hope of gaining back a stable region.[49] Cox was aware of the dangers of bringing back the Sheikh, but he was also aware that one of the main reasons for the unrest in the region was the growing perception that the earlier promises of autonomy would be abandoned and the British would bring the Kurdish people under direct rule of the Arab government in Baghdad. The Kurdish dream of an independent state was growing less likely which caused conflict in the region.[50] Bringing the Sheikh back was their only chance of a peaceful Iraqi state in the region and against Turkey.
Cox agreed to bring back the Sheikh and name him governor of southern Kurdistan. In 1921, in the hope that he would support the British in their fight against tribes allied with the Kemalist government of Turkey, Mahmud Barzanji was pardoned and reinstated as governor of Sulaymaniyah, where on October 10 (according to other sources, October 1922) he appointed a Kurdish government and proclaimed an independent state. He declared Sulaymaniyah the capital of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. He had previously been proclaimed king by the cabinet.[51]
The kingdom was not recognized by Great Britain and was subjected to military repression. The king attempted to expand his domain, which barely extended beyond the area surrounding Sulaymaniyah, but was thwarted by the resistance of the Jaff and Pishdar tribes, most of whom opposed him.[52] He also made himself unpopular among intellectual Kurdish nationalists by thwarting the hopes of some representatives who had traveled from Baghdad to participate in the government and by having one of them assassinated.[53]
On December 20, 1922, Cox also agreed to a joint Anglo-Iraqi declaration that would allow a Kurdish government if they were able to form a constitution and agree on boundaries. Cox knew that with the instability in the region and the fact that there were many Kurdish groups it would be nearly impossible for them to come to a solution.[54] Upon his return, Mahmud proceeded to pronounce himself King of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The Sheikh rejected the deal with the British and began working in alliance with the Turks against the British. Cox realized the situation and in 1923 he denied the Kurds any say in the Iraqi government and withdrew his offer of their own independent state.
On January 8, 1923, Kurdish rebel and tribal chief Simko Shikak visited the Kingdom of Kurdistan and met with Mahmud Barzanji. Simko was welcomed with a military parade, and the day of his visit was made a national holiday.[55]
Despite opposition by other regional tribes, possibly fearful of the shaykh's growing power, Shaykh Mahmud's fighters continued to oppose British rule after the shaykh's arrest. Although no longer organized under one leader, this intertribal force was "actively anti-British", engaging in hit-and-run attacks, killing British military officers, and participating in another – left the Turkish ranks to join the Kurdish army.
Barzanji was defeated when the British sent out a British force to capture Sulaymaniyah in July 1924,[56] and in January 1926 the League of Nations gave the mandate over the territory back to Iraq, with the provision for special rights for Kurds. Following the defeat him, he retreated into the Qandil Mountains. In 1930–1931, Sheykh Mahmud Barzanji made his last unsuccessful attempt to gain power.
The Sheikh was involved in uprisings against the British until 1932, when the Royal Air Force and British-trained Iraqis were able to capture the Sheikh again and exile him to southern Iraq.[54][57]
Finally, there is evidence from oral histories suggesting that Barzanji contemplated returning to Kurdistan clandestinely but was dissuaded by advisers concerned about provoking harsher reprisals. This internal debate reveals a more cautious, pragmatic side to his leadership not often portrayed.[48]
Diplomacy and Foreign Relations
Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji operated within a complex and shifting diplomatic landscape during the early 20th century, as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of British colonial influence in Mesopotamia opened both risks and opportunities for local leaders. Though rooted in his role as a prominent religious figure—the head of the Qadiriyya Sufi order in southern Kurdistan—Mahmud pursued broader political ambitions that extended beyond local governance. Initially, in 1918, the British appointed him as governor of “Southern Kurdistan,” hoping to administer the region indirectly through a respected Kurdish leader. However, Mahmud quickly demonstrated that he was not a pliable proxy, but rather a nationalist-minded leader with a vision of Kurdish autonomy or independence. His relationship with the British soured rapidly as he began consolidating power, raising a militia, and refusing to accept colonial oversight.[58]
After his first rebellion in 1919 and subsequent exile to India, Mahmud returned in 1922 with renewed determination. He was once again installed by the British as governor, but almost immediately declared himself “King of Kurdistan.” During this second period of power, he actively sought to establish external alliances that could support his state-building ambitions. While documentary evidence is scarce, British intelligence reports from the time suggest that Mahmud may have made informal overtures to the Kemalist regime in Turkey, perhaps hoping to form a strategic partnership against their mutual British adversary. However, Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), though engaged in anti-colonial warfare himself, remained wary of Kurdish autonomy, which could threaten the integrity of the new Turkish state. The Turkish government ultimately provided no significant support to Mahmud’s cause.[59]
Mahmud’s potential ties to Persia (modern Iran) were also limited. Although Kurdish populations existed across the border, the central Iranian government, under Reza Shah, was focused on consolidating power and viewed Kurdish tribal autonomy as a threat rather than an asset. There is no concrete evidence that Tehran provided any assistance to Mahmud, although Kurdish networks along the border may have facilitated communication and minor logistical aid.[60] His hopes of establishing wider regional recognition or support for an independent Kurdistan were thus largely unrealized, leaving his rebellion diplomatically isolated.
Notably, Mahmud had little to no contact with the Soviet Union, despite the USSR’s interest in supporting anti-British and anti-imperialist movements during the 1920s. The religious and traditionalist character of Mahmud’s movement may have made him an unappealing ally for the Soviets, who were more inclined to support secular or Marxist-aligned revolutionaries.[61] Likewise, Mahmud’s religious orientation as a Sufi sheikh and his use of Islamic legitimacy to bolster his political claims set him apart from more modernist or secular nationalists in the wider region.
His diplomatic isolation ultimately contributed to the collapse of his movement. The lack of regional allies and the overwhelming military advantage of British forces—including air power deployed from the Royal Air Force—led to his defeat in 1924. From exile and in later years, Mahmud remained a symbol of early Kurdish resistance, but his failure to secure meaningful foreign partnerships marked a key weakness of his leadership and a significant obstacle to the realization of his political aims.[62]
Relations with Contemporary Kurdish Leaders
Mahmud Barzanji’s political and religious leadership was deeply intertwined with his relationships to other prominent Kurdish figures of the early 20th century. His position as both a tribal chief and a Sufi Sheikh meant that his alliances and rivalries extended across tribal, religious, and nationalist lines.[63]
One of his closest contemporaries was Sheikh Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani, leader of a powerful tribal confederation in Iraqi Kurdistan. While both men shared a common goal of Kurdish autonomy, their approaches sometimes diverged. Mahmud’s strong religious authority as a Qadiri Sheikh allowed him to assert spiritual leadership over Kurdish communities, which occasionally created tensions with tribal leaders like al-Kaylani, whose power base was more secular and tribal in nature. Despite these differences, there were moments of cooperation during Mahmud’s revolts against British rule, particularly in mobilizing resistance in the Sulaymaniyah region and coordinating military efforts.[64]
Another significant figure was Sheikh Said, whose own uprising in the Turkish-controlled part of Kurdistan paralleled Mahmud’s resistance in Iraq. Though operating under different colonial powers (the British in Iraq and the Turks in eastern Anatolia), Mahmud maintained correspondence and ideological solidarity with Sheikh Said. This connection highlighted the transnational nature of Kurdish nationalism at the time, emphasizing a shared vision of Kurdish independence beyond imposed colonial borders.[65]
Mahmud’s relations with the Barzan tribe itself were complex. Although he hailed from the Barzanji family, which was influential in the Barzan region, not all tribal leaders aligned fully with his ambitions. Some tribal sheikhs preferred local autonomy without overt rebellion, fearing retribution from British or Iraqi authorities. Nevertheless, Mahmud’s status as a Qadiri Sheikh helped bridge these divisions by providing a religious legitimacy that transcended tribal rivalry, uniting diverse Kurdish groups under a shared spiritual and political cause.[65]
In contrast, Mahmud’s relationship with the Kurdish nationalist intellectuals emerging in urban centers such as Halabjaand Erbil was more ambivalent. While these intellectuals admired his resistance against colonial powers, they also critiqued his traditionalist and theocratic approach, advocating for a more secular and modernist Kurdish nationalism. This tension between tribal-religious leadership and modern nationalist movements would characterize Kurdish politics throughout the 20th century.[66]
Overall, Mahmud Barzanji’s network of alliances and rivalries reflected the fragmented and multifaceted nature of Kurdish society at the time. His ability to navigate religious authority, tribal politics, and nascent nationalism enabled him to lead several revolts, but also limited the scope of a unified Kurdish front against colonial and state powers. His legacy influenced both religious and secular Kurdish leadership in subsequent decades.[63]
Relations with Other Sufi Orders
Mahmud Barzanji’s authority was deeply rooted in his role as a leading Qadiriyya sheikh, a Sufi order long dominant in southern Kurdistan, especially in the Sulaymaniyah region. However, during the years of his political prominence (1918–1924), he faced rivalry and tension from other Sufi orders, most notably the Naqshbandiyya, which was gaining influence in neighboring regions such as Bahdinan and parts of Bahdinan and Erbil.[67]
The Naqshbandi order, represented most prominently by Sheikh Ahmed Barzani and the Barzani family, adhered to a stricter and more reformist interpretation of Islam and developed an alternative model of tribal-Sufi leadership. While the Qadiriyya emphasized inherited charisma (baraka) and spiritual descent, the Naqshbandiyya focused on moral reform, scriptural rigor, and often challenged the hereditary authority of Qadiri sheikhs such as Barzanji.[68] These theological and political tensions created friction between the two orders, particularly as each tried to assert dominance over local tribal networks and spiritual loyalty.
Though there is no record of open military conflict between Barzanji and the Naqshbandi leaders during his reign, British reports and Kurdish oral histories describe the relationship as one of guarded competition. British officials like Major Noel noted that Barzanji “viewed the spread of Naqshbandi influence in the north with concern,” especially as Sheikh Ahmed Barzani began to attract tribal allegiance from former Qadiri areas in the early 1920s.[68]
In religious discourse, both orders often claimed to represent the authentic Islamic leadership of the Kurds, but their visions diverged sharply: Barzanji’s Qadiriyya remained loyal to established tribal and landowning elites, while the Naqshbandiyya at times aligned with more egalitarian or populist sentiments. These dynamics would later shape Kurdish political movements, especially as the Barzanis emerged as national leaders in the 1930s–40s, partly in reaction to the fall of Barzanji's Qadiri-based leadership.[69]
Ultimately, Barzanji’s uneasy coexistence with rival Sufi networks illustrates how spiritual authority and political leadership overlapped and competed in early 20th-century Kurdistan. His failure to build alliances with figures like Ahmad Barzani arguably limited the geographic and tribal reach of his kingdom, confining his influence largely to central and southern Kurdish areas.[70]
Language, Identity, and Symbolism
Although Mahmud Barzanji’s authority was primarily rooted in tribal and religious legitimacy, his political aspirations between 1918 and 1924 increasingly incorporated elements of Kurdish national identity. During his self-proclaimed reign as “King of Kurdistan” (1922–1924), he made repeated appeals to Kurdish unity, using ethnic symbolism and linguistic assertions that marked a shift from strictly religious leadership to proto-nationalist representation.[71]
While there is no evidence that his administration implemented a formal language policy, oral accounts and British reports suggest that Kurdish was used in proclamations, court communications, and local governance, especially in contrast to Arabic or Turkish, which had dominated under previous regimes.[71] British political officer Major E. W. C. Noel noted that Barzanji's proclamations “emphasized the Kurdishness of his kingdom,” and that regional administration under him functioned in a distinctly Kurdish linguistic and cultural environment.[72]
The adoption of titles such as "King of Kurdistan" (Malikî Kurdistan) carried enormous symbolic weight. It asserted a territorially and ethnically defined authority rather than a purely religious or Ottoman-derived one. In several surviving documents and declarations from 1922–1924, Barzanji used formulations such as "the Kurdish people" (gelê kurd) and "the future of Kurdistan", suggesting a conscious attempt to articulate Kurdish collective identity.[73] British officials viewed this rhetoric with suspicion, interpreting it as “incipient Kurdish nationalism” in a region they had hoped to integrate into the newly formed Iraqi state.[74]
Despite this, Barzanji's vision of Kurdish identity remained hybrid and transitional. It blended tribal loyalties, Sufi religious authority, and ethno-linguistic pride rather than fully embracing a secular nationalist ideology like that of later Kurdish movements. His approach laid an early foundation for the emergence of modern Kurdish nationalism, even if framed in the idioms of traditional authority.[74]
Military Strategies and Guerrilla Warfare Tactics
Mahmud Barzanji’s military leadership during his multiple uprisings against British and later Iraqi authority demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of guerrilla warfare and tribal mobilization, which was critical to his ability to sustain resistance despite facing a better-equipped colonial force. Rather than relying solely on conventional warfare, Barzanji exploited the rugged terrain of Kurdistan, using mountainous regions, narrow valleys, and hidden passes to his tactical advantage. This terrain familiarity allowed his forces to conduct swift ambushes, retreat efficiently, and avoid large-scale confrontations that would have favored the British army's superior firepower and resources.[75]
His strategy hinged on mobilizing a network of tribal militias, each loyal primarily to their local chieftains but united under Barzanji’s charismatic and religious leadership. This decentralized military structure allowed flexibility; tribal units operated semi-autonomously, executing hit-and-run attacks and sabotage missions without requiring centralized command. Such tactics wore down British forces over time, inflicted material and psychological damage, and demonstrated the difficulties of occupying Kurdish territories.[76][77]
Barzanji also understood the importance of leveraging the local population’s support. His forces carefully balanced coercion and cooperation, securing shelter, supplies, and intelligence from sympathetic villages while punishing collaborators to maintain discipline and deter betrayal. This blend of social and military strategy was instrumental in sustaining prolonged insurgency efforts.[77][78]
Moreover, Barzanji’s forces incorporated religious symbolism into their warfare, framing battles as jihad against colonial occupiers. This not only served as a motivational tool for fighters but also helped legitimize his military campaigns within the broader socio-political context of Kurdish society, where religious authority was deeply respected.[76]
Despite these strengths, Barzanji’s guerrilla tactics faced significant challenges. Tribal rivalries and shifting alliances sometimes undermined unified command and strategic cohesion. The British counterinsurgency responded by exploiting these divisions, using intelligence networks, bribery, and forming alliances with rival tribes to isolate Barzanji’s forces. Furthermore, the colonial power’s superior logistics, air power, and artillery often neutralized guerrilla advantages in direct engagements.[75]
Ultimately, while Barzanji’s military strategies did not lead to a lasting Kurdish state, they laid important groundwork for Kurdish armed resistance traditions. His effective use of terrain, tribal networks, and ideological motivation influenced later Kurdish movements and remain a significant chapter in the history of asymmetric warfare in the region.[75]
Socio-economic context in Southern Kurdistan
Following the collapse of Ottoman rule, the region around Sulaymaniyah remained a primarily agrarian and tribal society, with landownership concentrated in the hands of feudal notables and Sufi leaders such as Mahmud Barzanji. These figures exercised dual authority: judicially through customary law, and spiritually via their religious standing as Qadiriyya sheikhs. Barzanji himself, inheriting both land and seduitional sway, emerged as a pivot between tribal elders and sedentary peasants in the post‑war vacuum.[79]
As governor under British indirect rule (appointed ca. 1918), he effectively collected taxes, administered justice, and distributed aid—including food and staple goods—through British intermediaries like Major Noel, which further entrenched his influence among rural Kurds.[80] His leadership thus typified the feudal agrarian order of early 20th-century Southern Kurdistan, where land-owning sheikhs mediated state authority and rural subsistence.[81]
The economic conditions of the peasantry—largely impoverished, tied to communal landholdings, and often lacking access to formal governance—fanned both loyalty and resentment. Barzanji's governance offered stability, yet his assertion of political power through uprisings (1919 and 1922–24) underscored the class tensions inherent in a society undergoing transformation from agrarian feudalism toward more centralized rule under the British Mandate. Thus, his dual role as feudal lord and rebel leader was deeply rooted in the socio‑economic fabric of his homeland.[80]
World War II
In May 1941, Barzanji staged a brief revolt in northern Iraq after the Rashid Ali coup of April 1941 before the British eventually occupied Sulaymaniyah on 6 June 1941. He hoped that the British would grant him an independent Kurdistan.[82]
Operation Mammoth
Operation Mammoth (German Unternehmen Mammut; named after Mahmud), was a German special forces mission in 1943 by the Wehrmacht, during World War II, for a team of two German Army officers, led by Gottfried Müller and accompanied by a Kurdish activist Ramzi Nafi Agha, to start a rebellion of the Iraqi Kurds in an attempt to expel the British from the region, gain control of the oil fields, and in some way deliver them to the Wehrmacht because Operation Barbarossa was not progressing as it was expected in reaching the Caucasus. In return for ejecting the British, the Kurds would supposedly be assisted in creating an independent Kurdistan.[83]
The aim was to instrumentalize the Kurds against British rule.[84] Lieutenant Gottfried Müller, supported by two soldiers with experience of the Orient, Friedrich Wilhelm Hoffmann and Georg Heinrich Adalbert Konieczny, as well as the Iraqi Kurd Ramzi Nafi Agha, was tasked with establishing contact with Mahmud Barzanji in the Kirkuk area, carrying out acts of sabotage in the oil region and preparing an anti-British uprising in northern Iraq.[85] Two further groups, consisting of specialists in astronomy and desert studies, linguists for Persian, Arabic and Turkish, and medical professionals to establish a civilian supply system, were to follow after the establishment of the first group. In addition to propaganda and intellectual gain, they would also begin a kind of nation-building.[86] German Oriental scholars were therefore also involved, especially Karl Hadank, the scientific administrator of the estate of the linguist Oskar Mann (d. 1917), who was quite prominent in the German Empire, and in particular Werner Caskel, a colleague of Max von Oppenheim. Ramzi Nafi Agha, who on his way to Germany via the Bosporus and the Balkans had numerous contacts with anti-British politicians in the nationalist government of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani as well as German agents in Istanbul, met both Hadank and Caskel during the preparation of the operation.[86]
This mission was already contained in Adolf Hitler Warfare Directive No. 30 of May 23, 1941: "The Arab freedom movement in the Middle East is our natural ally against England. In this context, the uprising in Iraq is of particular importance. It strengthens the forces hostile to England in the Middle East beyond Iraq's borders, disrupts English communications, and ties up English troops and shipping at the expense of other theaters of war."[83]
Failure
The mission failed on the first day. The weapons and equipment containers were lost during the parachute jump, and the group landed 300 km from their intended target. Twelve days later, the British arrested the participants. Mahmud, Ramzi and the German officers were taken prisoner by British and Iraqi forces, tortured, and sentenced to death. The German participants and Mahmud Barzanji were taken to British military camps in Germany in 1947 and later released. Ramzi was sentenced to life imprisonment but was released in 1947 due to mental illness; he died in his hometown of Erbil in 1949.[83]
Death and legacy
Sheikh Mahmud died in 1956 in a Hospital in Baghdad. He left behind three sons.[87][88] He is still remembered today with displays of him around Iraqi Kurdistan and especially in Sulaimaniah. He is a hero to the Kurdish people to this day, as he is thought of as an pioneering Kurdish nationalist who fought for the independence and respect of his people.[89] He is regarded as a pioneer for many future Kurd leaders.[90]
Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji remains a complex and iconic figure in Kurdish history. While his uprisings were ultimately unsuccessful in establishing a permanent Kurdish state, they are seen by many as a foundational step in the modern Kurdish national movement. He is often referred to as the "King of Kurdistan" (Kurdish: Şêx Mehmûdê Berzencî, Şahê Kurdistanê), a title that — though short-lived — reflects his symbolic role in Kurdish memory.
His eldest son Baba Ali Shaikh Mahmood (1912-1996), was an Iraqi politician and a prominent Kurdish leader who led several uprisings against the British Mandate of Iraq in the 1920s. Baba Ali was actively involved in Iraqi politics and held various governmental positions throughout his career. He served as Minister of Finance from 1946 to 1947, Minister of Transport from 1958 to 1959, and Minister of Agriculture from February to August 1963.[91]
His second eldest son Sheikh Latif Hafid al-Barzanji was also a politician in Iraq.[87] The British reported the following about Latif:[88]
“Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has the chance to do so.“
— British documents on foreign affairs
Unlike his father, Latif supported Mustafa Barzani's first uprising in 1943[92] and became a founding member of Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946.[87] During Barzani's absence in Soviet exile, Latif served in Iraq from 1946 onwards, initially as one of the two vice-presidents of the KDP,[93] but in fact the party was led by left-wing officials around Ibrahim Ahmad.[94]
Mahmud Barzanji remains a foundational figure in the history of Kurdish nationalism, widely regarded as the first modern Kurdish leader to combine religious, tribal, and nationalist authority into a coherent political movement. His revolts against British rule between 1919 and 1924, particularly his short-lived declaration of the Kingdom of Kurdistan (1922–1924), are seen as early expressions of Kurdish aspirations for independence. Although ultimately defeated and exiled, Barzanji’s legacy endures as a symbol of resistance and Kurdish unity. He is especially remembered for his efforts to institutionalize Kurdish governance through the formation of a cabinet, use of national symbols (flag, currency, press), and appeals to international recognition. While opinions about his authoritarian style differ—some viewing him as a unifier, others as an opportunist—his role in embedding Kurdish identity in the political imagination of the early 20th century remains undisputed. His fusion of Sufi leadership with modern nationalist rhetoric inspired later Kurdish movements and leaders, including Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Today, Barzanji is commemorated in both popular memory and academic literature as a pioneer of Kurdish self-determination.[95][96]
In contemporary Kurdish historiography, Mahmud is celebrated for his defiance of colonial powers and for articulating a distinctly Kurdish political identity. His revolts are commemorated in poetry, song, and academic literature, particularly in the Sulaymaniyah region. However, some scholars also critique his reliance on traditional tribal structures and note that his vision lacked a long-term institutional blueprint for governance.
An academic source published by the University of Cambridge has stated: "Kurdish nationalists in the diaspora, as long-distance nationalist actors, have played a crucial role in the development of Kurdish nationalism both inside and outside the region. They strongly hold on to a Kurdish identity and promote the territoriality of this unified nation in which one of their motives is Sheikh Mahmuds personality and reachments. In line with the contemporary international normative framework, they use the rhetoric of suffering, the incidents of human rights abuses and their right to statehood to influence the way host states, other states, international organizations, scholars, journalists and the international media perceive their case and the actions of their home states. They promote the idea that Kurdistan is one country artificially divided among regional states and that this dividedness is the source of Kurdish suffering."[97]
Despite these complexities, Mahmud Barzanji occupies a revered place in Kurdish collective memory — as a religious leader turned revolutionary who attempted to forge Kurdish unity in one of the most turbulent eras of the early 20th century.
The Great Mosque of Sulaymaniyah contains a shrine dedicated to Mahmud Barzanji.[8][98]
Reception
Some sources claim that Mahmud Barzanji was the key point in the beginning of the Iraqi Kurdish conflict.[99]
Political Vision and Leadership
Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji's leadership blended religious authority, tribal power, and emerging Kurdish nationalism. As a respected Sufi leader of the Qadiriyya order in Sulaymaniyah, he wielded substantial spiritual and moral influence across Kurdish tribes. This authority gave him a unique position to bridge tribal rivalries and galvanize support for broader political goals.[99]
His short-lived administration during the 1922 Kingdom of Kurdistan demonstrated an early attempt at Kurdish state-building. Mahmud appointed a cabinet that reflected regional diversity, including a Christian finance minister, showcasing an inclusive vision that extended beyond tribal or sectarian lines. Despite this, his governance was often shaped by personal authority rather than institutional structures, a common feature of early nationalist movements in the region.[99]
Although he positioned himself as a monarch, Mahmud’s rule was neither absolutist nor purely symbolic; he issued proclamations, administered local taxes, and attempted to establish diplomatic relations — most notably with the British. However, his relationship with British authorities remained inconsistent: while at times cooperative, it was ultimately defined by repeated cycles of rebellion and suppression. His demands consistently centered on Kurdish autonomy or outright independence, particularly in the Mosul Vilayet.[99]
Religious Role
Mahmud Barzanji’s role as a Sufi Sheikh of the Qadiriyya order extended beyond the spiritual domain and influenced the way he governed. His court in Sulaymaniyah functioned not only as a political headquarters but also as a religious hub, where religious rituals, dispute mediation, and traditional Islamic jurisprudence were practiced under his supervision.[100]
The Qadiriyya order’s emphasis on hierarchy and obedience likely helped Mahmud maintain discipline among his followers during times of revolt. Unlike more decentralized tribal structures, Sufi allegiance created an alternative loyalty framework that was both spiritual and personal, enabling him to mobilize support beyond tribal affiliations.[101]
Some oral histories and Kurdish-language sources describe how Mahmud’s sermons and religious authority helped bridge rivalries between tribes, at least temporarily, by invoking a higher moral and spiritual cause. This is rarely highlighted in English-language accounts, which tend to emphasize his political ambitions over his Sufi strategies.[101]
Ideology
Mahmud Barzanji's ideology combined Kurdish nationalism with a strong belief in religious legitimacy, as he claimed descent from a prominent Sufi lineage of the Qadiriyya order. He envisioned an autonomous or independent Kurdistan rooted in Islamic principles, tribal leadership, and Kurdish cultural identity. Although he initially cooperated with the British after World War I, Barzanji opposed continued foreign control and viewed British mandates as a threat to Kurdish self-determination. His political vision was not strictly secular; rather, it intertwined traditional Islamic authority with modern nationalist aspirations. Barzanji sought to unify the diverse Kurdish tribes under a central leadership, often portraying himself as both a political ruler and a spiritual guide. His resistance movements in the 1920s reflected a blend of anti-colonial sentiment, pan-Kurdish unity, and the preservation of religious and tribal structures.[102][103]
He was a charismatic and ambitious leader whose personality blended religious authority, nationalist fervor, and pragmatic tribal diplomacy. As a prominent Sufi sheikh of the Qadiriyya order, he used his spiritual legitimacy to mobilize Kurdish tribes, framing his revolts as both a jihad and a national liberation movement. His repeated uprisings and self-proclamation as “King of Kurdistan” reflect a determined and visionary character who resisted both British and Turkish influence in favor of Kurdish self-rule. Barzanji was known for his strong will, unyielding principles, and ability to navigate the complex tribal landscape of southern Kurdistan, often including religious and ethnic minorities in governance structures. However, his centralization of power and royal aspirations also made him a polarizing figure, with some Kurdish leaders viewing him as overly authoritarian. Overall, Barzanji's personality was defined by a powerful mix of spiritual charisma, nationalist conviction, and political resilience.[104]
At the same time, Barzanji was pragmatic in his political approach. He used Islamic symbolism not only to mobilize support but to legitimize rebellion as a jihad against foreign (British) occupation. His rhetoric framed the struggle as both a nationalist liberation and a religious obligation, blurring the lines between political resistance and spiritual warfare.[34]
Furthermore, Barzanji’s ideology included a strong anti-imperialist dimension long before it became a common theme in Kurdish political discourse. He recognized the British mandate as a new form of colonial domination replacing the Ottoman Empire, and he rejected the legitimacy of any foreign-imposed borders or governments in Kurdistan.[34]
Despite his religious conservatism, Barzanji was also a protector of Kurdish cultural traditions and local autonomy. He resisted efforts by both the British and later the Iraqi state to centralize authority, which threatened tribal structures, customary law, and the religious institutions that underpinned Kurdish society.[34]
Interestingly, some scholars argue that Barzanji’s ideology prefigured later Kurdish political Islam movements by combining Sufi mysticism with Kurdish nationalism, but without adopting the radicalism or modernist reformism seen in the late 20th century. His leadership style emphasized charismatic authority and traditional legitimacy rather than institutional political structures.[34]
Tribal fighters from both Iran and Iraq quickly allied themselves with Shaykh Mahmud as he became more successful in opposing British rule. According to McDowall, the Shaykh's forces "were largely Barzinja tenantry and tribesmen, the Hamavand under Karim Fattah Beg, and disaffected sections of the Jaf, Jabbari, Shaykh Bizayni and Shuan tribes".[34]
At the root of the rebellion, Sheikh Mahmud's leadership appealed to both Kurdish nationalist and religious feelings. Although he knew he could not directly defeat the British, Sheikh Mahmud hoped to seek recognition of Kurdish nationalism by advocating a 'free united Kurdistan'. Using his authority as a religious leader, Sheikh Mahmud called for a jihad against the British in 1919 and thus acquired the support of many Kurds indifferent to the nationalist struggle. Although the intensity of their struggle was motivated by religion, Kurdish peasantry seized the idea of "national and political liberty for all" and strove for "an improvement in their social standing".[34]
See also
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Sources
- Natali, Denise (2005). The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, And Iran. NY: Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0-8156-3084-5.
- Özoğlu, Hakan (2004). Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries. SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-7914-5993-5.
- Schaller, Dominik J.; Zimmerer, Jürgen (March 2008), "Late Ottoman genocides: the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Young Turkish population and extermination policies—introduction", Journal of Genocide Research, 10 (1): 7–14, doi:10.1080/14623520801950820, S2CID 71515470
- Mahmud Berzenci'nin Lenin'e yazdığı mektup Kürtler Lenin'e Başvuruyor
- Kemal Mazhar Ahmed (Çev: M. Hüseyin), 1. Dünya Savaşı'nda Kürdistan, Doz Yayınları, İstanbul, Ekim 1996.
- MS Lazarev (Çev.: Mehmet Demir), Emperyalizm ve Kürt Sorunu (1917-1923), Öz-Ge Yayınları, Ankara, ISBN 975-7861-00-6
- Şakîrê Xıdoyê Mıhoyan (Çev.: J. Slav), Irak'ta Kürt Sorunu, İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında, Pêrî Yayınları, İstanbul, Mart 1998, ISBN 975-8245-05-8
- Sovyetler Birliği Bilimler Akademisi Doğu Bilimleri Enstitüsü ile Ermenistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti Bilimler Akademisi Doğu Bilimleri Enstitüsü Kürt Komisyonu (Çev.: M. Aras), Yeni ve Yakın Çağda Kürt Siyaset Tarihi, Pêrî yayınları, İstanbul, Temmuz 1998, ISBN 975-8245-06-6
- Wadie Jwaideh (Çev.: İsmail Çekem ve Alper Duman; Haz.: Nevzat Kıraç), Kürt Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi: Kökenleri ve Gelişimi, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, ISBN 975-470-170-9, p. 305-392.
- Zeynel Abidin Kızılyaprak, Hasan Kaya, Şerif Beyaz, Zana Farqini, İstanbul Kürt Enstitüsü, 1900'den 2000'e Kürtler - Kronolojik Albüm, Özgür Bakış Milenyum Armağanı, İstanbul, Ocak 2000, p. 23, 40.
- Edward William Charles Noel, Kürdistan 1919: Binbaşı Noel'in Günlüğü, Avesta, İstanbul, 1999, ISBN 975-7112-60-7
- Mehmet Kemal Işık (Torî), 'Şeyh Mahmud Berzenci', Ünlü Kürt Bilgin ve Birinci Kuşak Aydınlar, Sorun Yayınları, İstanbul, Kasım 2000, ISBN 975-431-111-0, p. 87-92.
- C.J. Edmond (Çev.: Serdar Şengül, Serap Rûken Şengül), Kürtler, Türkler ve Araplar: Kuzey-doğu Irak'ta siyaset, seyahat ve inceleme (1919-1925), Avesta, İstanbul, 2003, ISBN 975-8637-46-0
- William Rupert Hay (Çev.: Fahriye Adsay), Kürdistan'da İki Yıl (1918-1920), Avesta Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, ISBN 975-8637-89-4
External links
- Ethnic Cleansing and the Kurds
- The Rebellion of Sheikh Mahmmud Barzanji, in German
- The Kingdom of Kurdistan
- Footnotes to History (Kurdistan, Kingdom of)
- Sheikh Mahmmud Barzanji