China's transnational lawfare

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly utilized non-Chinese legal systems and institutions to advance its objectives beyond its borders. This practice and its variations have been described as lawfare.

According to a 2023 United States Department of Defense report, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began developing the "three warfares" doctrine in the early 2000s, including the use of psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare, which "uses domestic and international laws to shape narratives and advance Chinese interests."^[1][2] The PRC has used lawfare in issues surrounding Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Xinjiang.^[3]

Some of the methods used by China's Operation Fox Hunt, a controversial effort to repatriate Chinese nationals from abroad, purportedly facing corruption charges, have also been described as lawfare. According to The Wall Street Journal, China says that it seeks "fugitive suspects, not dissidents and refugees", and has declared its lawsuit strategy a success.^[4] According to Canadian legal counsel David Matas, lawfare has been used by China to suppress Falun Gong in other countries, including the United States.^[5]

Advocacy groups say that China has employed Interpol Red Notices, which request the provisional arrest of individuals pending extradition, to target dissidents using financial crime as the most common pretext. Other bases cited include terrorism and practicing Falun Gong in China.^[6][7]

China and its state-linked entities have increasingly filed civil lawsuits in foreign courts against dissidents abroad.^[4] Legal experts note that many cases likely go unnoticed because they are filed by state-linked proxies to cover Beijing's direct role.^[8] While framed as legal disputes involving fraud or misconduct, human rights advocates argue that these suits are often intended to silence or coerce the targets. Even when unsuccessful, such lawsuits can impose heavy financial and emotional burdens on defendants.^[4][8][9]

Defamation lawsuits filed by Chinese companies in foreign courts against researchers, media, and nonprofits reporting on human rights abuses and their alleged link to the Chinese government and Communist Party (CCP) have been described as a form of lawfare aimed at discouraging negative media coverage (SLAPP).^[10][11]

China has also sought to influence extradition proceedings and abuse foreign government databases to monitor or suppress critics abroad.^[12][13] Through proxies, the PRC challenged the tax-exempt status of a target by filing a complaint with the U.S. IRS to strip the target of its tax-exempt status to impede its operation and influence.^[14] Such challenges filed through lawful government channels are described as a form of lawfare when done strategically to intimidate or hinder an opponent.^[15]

In 2018, Peng Xufeng and his wife were sued in California by Changsha Metro Group Co., a Chinese state-owned company, for alleged bribery and misconduct. Observers noted that the case appeared to align with the CCP political objectives as well as commercial claims.^[4]

In 2018, Xu Jin and Liu Fang were sued by Xinba Construction Group Co. in New Jersey for alleged corruption. They countersued, claiming harassment by Chinese operatives, including surveillance and the kidnapping of a family member in China. The Wall Street Journal described the lawsuit as an example of the CCP's lawfare.^[4]

In March 2019, Polish authorities detained Chinese-born Swedish citizen Li Zhihui, a Falun Gong follower, based on an Interpol Red Notice requested by the PRC for alleged fraud. Although a lower court approved the extradition, Poland's Supreme Court later overturned the decision. The Swedish government voiced opposition to the extradition.^[16][17] Li was released in March 2021 after two years in detention.^[18]

In July 2021, Uyghur activist Idris Hasan, also known as Yidiresi Aishan, was arrested by the Moroccan authorities under an Interpol Red Notice requested by the PRC, which was seeking his extradition on allegations of "belonging to a terrorist organization."^[19][20] Although Interpol cancelled the notice in August 2021, a Moroccan court approved his extradition later that December. Advocacy groups campaigned against his extradition to China, and he was released from a Moroccan prison in February 2025, after 43 months in detention.^[21]

In 2022, a Hong Kong lawmaker called for the extradition under the PRC-introduced National Security Law of two Danish legislators who hosted Ted Hui, an exiled member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council. While no formal request was made, the Chinese embassy in Denmark sought legal assistance, prompting Denmark's intelligence services to warn those targeted of potential legal risks while traveling abroad.^[12]

In 2023, Hui Muslim activist Ma Ju was sued in New York by a Chinese state-linked entity for $12.5 million following his public reporting on religious repression of Muslims in Xinjiang. Human rights advocates viewed the lawsuit as retaliation.^[8]

In 2023, John Chen and Lin Feng, unregistered PRC agents, sought to manipulate the whistleblower program of the IRS against Shen Yun Performing Arts, which is affiliated with Falun Gong, by filing a defective complaint with the IRS aimed at stripping the entity of its tax-exempt status. Both were later sentenced for bribing an IRS official to influence the IRS's handling of the complaint.^{[14][22][23][24]}

Chinese companies have filed or threatened defamation lawsuits against researchers, nonprofits, and media outlets in the U.S., Europe, and Australia, often involving legal action on topics such as forced labor, human rights abuses, connections between Chinese companies and the Chinese state, and U.S. national security risks.^[10][11]  

In 2019, Huawei threatened to sue the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, an Australian think tank, for releasing a report that contained allegations that servers provided by Huawei to a coalition of African nations were sending data to Shanghai.^[10]

In November 2019, Huawei filed defamation lawsuits in France against a researcher at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research, a TV presenter, and a production company, for the researcher's statements on a TV show that Huawei was controlled by the Chinese state and by the CCP.^[25][26]

In April 2020, BYD sued Vice Media for defamation over a Vice Media article that alleged BYD was associated with companies using forced Uyghur labor in their supply chains. BYD filed a similar lawsuit in November 2020 against the non-profit Alliance for American Manufacturing (AAM) for calling BYD an arm of the Chinese state and linking it to forced Uyghur labor. Both cases were dismissed.^[11]

In September 2023, Autel Robotics, a Chinese drone company, threatened to sue a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute over an opinion article published in Defense News. The article stated that drones made by the Chinese company could pose a national security risk by mapping U.S. infrastructure. The Chinese company called the article "defamatory and damaging."^[10]

In June 2024, BGI, a Chinese biotechnology company, accused a researcher at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., of making defamatory remarks in a published report and demanded that the report be retracted. The report stated that the Chinese state was most likely involved in funding the growth of BGI.^[10]

The PRC's use of transnational lawfare has raised concerns about its impact on host country sovereignty, the rule of law, and international legal norms.

Legal scholars note that U.S. legal doctrines such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and international comity can create an imbalance. Authoritarian states can initiate lawsuits in U.S. courts while being protected from similar suits themselves, enabling one-sided legal harassment of political opponents.^[9]

Critics also argue that the burden of challenging politically motivated Interpol Red Notices often falls on individual countries or defendants, which can legitimize authoritarian aims under the appearance of legality.^[27]

According to Freedom House, China's use of transnational lawfare risks undermining democratic legal systems and reshaping global norms to favor authoritarian governance models.^[28]

Although Chinese companies may have valid grounds to pursue defamation lawsuits to address false allegations, experts caution that lawsuits aimed at individual researchers, nonprofit organizations, or media outlets raise different issues, with concerns that the legal tools are being used strategically to silence legitimate criticism and academic research.^[10][11]

• Vexatious litigation
• Transnational repression by China
• Extraterritorial jurisdiction

• U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2023 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 2

 This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States government.