Behnam Shahriyari

Behnam Shahriyari (Persian: بهنام شهریاری‎; between 1965 and 1968^[1] – 21 June 2025), also known by his aliases Seyed Ali Akbar Mir Vakili, Seyed Hamid Reza Shahcheraghi and Hojatollah Narimani, was a senior official in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, specifically associated with Unit 190.

This unit is responsible for the clandestine transfer and smuggling of weapons to Iranian-aligned armed groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Assad regime in Syria (formerly), and the Houthis in Yemen.^{[1][2][3][4][5]} Shahriyari was subject to several international sanctions by several countries.^[6]

Shahriyari was killed on 21 June 2025, during the Iran–Israel war, after an Israeli strike in Qom Province.^[7]

• Between 2000 and 2002, he served in Lebanon on behalf of the Quds Force, transferring military equipment from Iran to Hezbollah.^[8]
• In May 2007, a shipment of weapons destined for Hezbollah was intercepted while being transported from Iran to Syria via Turkey. The cargo, which was concealed in containers aboard a train that was later derailed, was found to include 122 mm mortar shells, explosives, and other military-grade materials. Investigations linked the operation to Behnam Shahariari, whose signature appeared on the shipment's bill of lading, representing the front company Shahariari Trading Ltd.^[8]
• Shahariari was involved in an attempt to transfer 36 containers from the Quds Force to Hezbollah using the MV Francop ship in the Francop Affair in November 2009. The containers, with about 500 tons of weapons, were seized in an Israeli Navy raid. This weapons smuggling used the Quds Force's front company Linertransport Kish (LTK), of which Shahariari was a director.^[8]

As part of Unit 190, Shahriyari oversaw the covert transport of weapons to Iranian proxies in the Middle East. His operations involved:

• Disguising weapons shipments as civilian goods such as powdered milk or vehicle parts.^[2][9][10]
• Utilizing front companies and falsified documentation to obscure the true nature of these transactions.^[2][9][10]
• Coordinating smuggling routes via air, sea, and land, often using intermediaries in Turkey, Lebanon, Sudan, and Iraq.^[9][10][2]

Shahriyari played a central role in illicit oil sales that generated revenue for the IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah. His network operated through:

• Collaborating with IRGC-linked individuals such as Rostam Qasemi, Alireza Kashanimehr, and Mohammad Sadegh Karimian.^[10]
• Employing financial schemes to hide illicit transactions through banks in Russia, China, Turkey, and Venezuela.^[10]
• Utilizing front companies such as Turkoca Import Export Transit Co., Ltd. in South Korea to falsify invoices and launder proceeds.^[10]

In 2009, Shahariari played a role in the transfer of specialized weapons from Iran intended for an attack in Turkey, as part of preparations for a coordinated operation between the Quds Force and Hezbollah in Istanbul. The plot was thwarted when Turkish security forces detained and interrogated the individuals involved.^[8][11] Shahariari also played a key role in Quds Force efforts to plan an attack in Turkey in early 2010. During the operational preparations, the Quds Force received support from local Turkish collaborators. The plot was ultimately foiled when Turkish security forces detained and interrogated a foreign facilitator and one of the operatives involved.^[8][12]

In 2008, Shahariari recruited and managed a network of Azeri operatives who, in coordination with members of Lebanese Hezbollah, were involved in planning attacks in Azerbaijan. As part of the operation, an apartment was rented to serve as a storage site for weapons, including explosives, detonators, and handguns. The plot was disrupted in its final stages by Azerbaijani security forces, who arrested and later sentenced both the Lebanese operatives and their Azeri accomplices.^[8] In early 2012, Shahariari was involved in smuggling weapons as part of Quds Force preparations for an attack in Azerbaijan. The plot was disrupted when Azerbaijani security forces apprehended two local facilitators, Rasim Aliev and Ali Huseynov, who had been gathering operational intelligence on potential targets. The investigation also uncovered the weapons smuggling route from Iran, and revealed the involvement of Quds Force operatives in the planned attack.^[8][13]

According to sources, Shahariari was also implicated in the transfer of weapons from Iran to Sudan, which were intercepted in March 2014 aboard the Klos C ship by Israeli Navy Shayetet 13 commandos in Operation Full Disclosure. The shipment's bill of lading listed the front company Al-Jazire Education of Exchange Trading, a known cover entity for Unit 190 operations in Sudan. Shahariari and Unit 190 had previously used this company for similar arms transfers. Iranian sources reported that elements within the Quds Force expressed strong dissatisfaction with Shahariari's negligence for approving the reuse of a company already exposed and linked to illicit activities.^[8]

Shahariari served on the boards of directors of multiple front companies affiliated with the Quds Force, which were used to facilitate weapons transfers and covert operations. Among these were Arash Zoobin, implicated in transporting weapons to Turkey by truck in 2011; Liner Transport Kish (LTK), where Shahariari also held the position of business and marketing manager, and which was used to deliver weapons shipments to Hezbollah in Lebanon; and Sepehr Taj Khavarmiyaneh, a company reportedly serving as a cover for additional clandestine Quds Force activities.^[8]

Shahriyari has been linked to the transfer of ammonium nitrate that led to the Beirut Port explosion in August 2020 in Beirut, Lebanon. Reports indicate that since 2011, the Iranian shipping company Liner Transport Kish (LTK), managed by Shahriyari and Mojtaba Mousavi Tabar, delivered significant quantities of ammonium nitrate to Hezbollah. Between 2011 and 2014, multiple shipments were sent to Beirut, including a consignment transported aboard the MV Rhosus vessel in August 2013, carrying approximately 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate. This shipment was seized and stored in the port, where it remained until its detonation in 2020, causing over 200 fatalities, 7,000 injuries, 300,000 displaced persons, and destruction.^[14]

Due to his role in terrorism financing and sanctions evasion, Shahriyari was subject to several international sanctions by several countries. In 2011, The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Shahriyari as a Specially Designated National (SDN) under Executive Order 13224. On August 15, 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Shahriyari as a Specially Designated National (SDN) under Executive Orders 13224 and 13886, freezing his assets and prohibiting transactions with U.S. persons.^[15][16] The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York announced charges against him, which included the seizure of $108 million linked to his network.^[17][1][18]

Additional sanctions were imposed on him by entities in Europe and the United Kingdom, due to his involvement in illicit financial transactions.^[19][20][21] On February 9, 2024, adding him to the UK’s Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets under the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023, with an update reaffirmed on September 2, 2024.^[22][23]

Behnam Shahriyari was killed during the Iran-Israel War. On 21 June 2025, while traveling by car in Qom province, western Iran, the car was hit by an Israeli drone strike.^[24] His funeral held on 28 June was set to take place along with those of all the top commanders killed during the Iran–Israel war.^[25]

• Unit 190
• Quds Force
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
• Mohammad Sadegh Karimian