148th Rifle Division

148th Rifle Division (September 15, 1939 – July 1945)
Active1939–1945
Country Soviet Union
Branch Red Army
TypeInfantry
SizeDivision
EngagementsOperation Barbarossa
Siege of Mogilev
Battle of Moscow
Voronezh–Kastornoye offensive
Battle of Kursk
Chernigov-Pripyat operation
Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive
Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive
Vistula–Oder offensive
Battle of Berlin
Prague offensive
Decorations Order of the Red Banner
 Order of Suvorov
Battle honoursChernigov
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Col. Filipp Mikhailovich Cherokmanov
Maj. Gen. Andrei Avksentevich Mishchenko
Col. Mikhail Ivanovich Goltsov

The 148th Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army on September 15, 1939, in the Volga Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of later that month. At the outbreak of the war it was still in this District, but was soon moving toward Gomel to join the 21st Army of Western Front. While still en route it was reassigned to 13th Army in the Mogilev area, and it would remain in this Army for most of the next two years. During the July fighting in this area it lost a rifle regiment and most of another, and was pulled back for rebuilding, but not far enough to prevent its front being penetrated in early August.

Formation

The 148th officially began forming on September 15, 1939, in the Volga Military District. The 496th Rifle Regiment was based at Engels, the 507th Rifle and 366th Artillery Regiments, plus the 199th Medical/Sanitation Battalion, were at Pugachyov, while the 654th Rifle Regiment was at Uralsk. At the outbreak of the war with Germany its order of battle was as follows:

  • 496th Rifle Regiment
  • 507th Rifle Regiment
  • 654th Rifle Regiment
  • 326th Artillery Regiment (until November 8, 1941, and then from November 29)[1]
  • 226th Antitank Battalion
  • 142nd Reconnaissance Company
  • 163rd Sapper Battalion
  • 173rd Signal Battalion (later 417th Signal Company)
  • 199th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 177th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
  • 96th Motor Transport Company
  • 345th Field Bakery
  • 247th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
  • 245th Field Postal Station
  • 687th Field Office of the State Bank

Col. Filipp Mikhailovich Cherokmanov took command of the division on the day it started forming; he had previously led the 157th Rifle Regiment of the 53rd Rifle Division, which had been stationed at Engels since 1935. As of June 22, the 148th was part of the 63rd Rifle Corps, along with the 53rd and the 167th Rifle Divisions. This Corps was assigned to 21st Army in the Reserve of the STAVKA High Command. Before arriving at the front the 53rd and 148th were reassigned to 45th Rifle Corps, still in 21st Army.[2] The division, although far from full strength, was already moving in the direction of Gomel, becoming part of the active army on July 2. 13th Army was headquartered at Mogilev. The division would remain in this Army until December 1943.[3]

Battles in Belarus

Marshal S. K. Timoshenko had taken over command of Western Front on July 2. 21st Army, which was anchoring the Front's southern flank, launched a partially-successful reconnaissance-in-force on July 5, and then a series of resolute and somewhat effective counterattacks against the right flank of 2nd Panzer Group in the area of Rahachow and Zhlobin.[4] On July 7 45th Corps, now consisting of the 148th and 187th Rifle Divisions, was reassigned to 13th Army in Western Front.[5]

2nd Panzer Group renewed its assault on July 10, when two divisions of XXIV Motorized Corps crossed the Dniepr River at and near Bykhaw, 29–32km south of Mogilev. This had been partially anticipated by Timoshenko in his intelligence summary of the previous night, but he had expected the assault to be made at Rahachow. As a result, only the 187th had been left to defend the sector north of Bykhaw. After four hours of fighting the XXIV Corps had seized a sizeable bridgehead and, after driving off Soviet forces, began construction of two bridges. That evening, Timoshenko reported that the 148th had joined the 187th and both were fighting against German units that had crossed in the Barsuki and Borkolobovo region, while at 1330 hours German tanks had been seen along the Mogilev–Novy-Bykhaw highway.[6]

The next day, the remainder of 2nd Panzer Group also crossed the Dniepr. Timoshenko reported that 13th Army was holding at Barsuki and Borkolobovo, with the 148th still attempting to concentrate while also engaging the German forces in the bridgehead; the 137th Rifle Division had now joined 45th Corps. On July 12, Western Front headquarters stated that 13th Army's positions had been penetrated to a depth of 20km. The commander of 2nd Panzer Group, Col. Gen. H. Guderian, now directed the XXIV Corps to move eastward through Chavusy and Krychaw to Roslavl. The Corps was also supposed to protect the Group's right flank. This penetration had forced a gap between the 13th and the adjacent 20th Army, and a major portion of the former was threatened with encirclement in the Mogilev area.[7]

Timoshenko's Offensive

In the afternoon of July 12 the STAVKA realized that desperate measures were required to restore the situation, including the need to "[c]onduct active operations along the Gomel' and Bobruisk axis to threaten the rear of the enemy's Mogilev grouping." Timoshenko and his staff had already issued a number of preliminary orders, which included directions to 13th Army to "destroy the enemy forces penetrating east of the Dnepr River and defend the Dnepr River line." No part of Timoshenko's plan was even remotely feasible. Only 21st Army scored a partial success when it managed to project a sizeable force across the Dniepr to briefly threaten German communications with Babruysk.[8]

13th Army was by now largely shattered by XXIV and XXXXVI Motorized Corps deep in its rear. Its commander, Lt. Gen. F. N. Remezov, was wounded on July 13 and replaced by Lt. Gen. V. F. Gerasimenko, who began withdrawing most of the Army east toward the Sozh River. However, the understrength 507th Rifle Regiment came under command of 172nd Rifle Division as part of the Mogilev Group which was to defend that city under command of Maj. Gen. F. A. Bakunin. Despite these facts, Timoshenko reported to the STAVKA that 20th and 13th Armies would eliminate the penetration on the Bykhaw axis using flank attacks by July 16. He also stated that "I am assigning the decisive attack to 13th Army's units as the most important mission and a matter of honor." In the event, apart from 21st Army, Timoshenko's offensive never came together as the panzers disrupted all his plans.[9]

Siege of Mogilev

Mogilev was a thorn in the side of Guderian, as it divided the bridgeheads of his two panzer corps over the Dniepr. It had already been made into a fortress that would be costly to take by frontal assault, as the first attacks proved. Instead, the panzers advanced early on July 13 for the Sozh, 97km farther east. By dusk on July 15 the XXIV Corps had created a wide salient from south of Mogilev east to the Sozh and back to the Dniepr while also straining to contain the roughly 100,000 men encircled in the city. Infantry from 2nd Army was urgently needed to relieve the armor, but until July 17 the task fell to the mobile troops. It was only on this date that the headquarters of the 148th completed its arrival near the front, in the vicinity of Krychaw, which was also the new location of Gerasimenko's headquarters. Meanwhile, the 496th Rifle Regiment had been encircled near Stary Bykhaw and forced to break out, with only some 400 personnel reaching friendly lines. As 13th Army withdrew and 2nd Panzer advanced, often on the same or parallel routes, Red Army troops sometimes caused havoc in the German "rear". On July 16 the 507th Regiment was reported as being on a long line from 24km south-southeast to 58km southeast of Mogilev, fighting as part of the 172nd Division's 747th Rifle Regiment. The city would finally fall on July 26, with the loss of the regiment.[10]

As Western Front had become unwieldy, on July 23 a new Central Front was formed, to include the reformed 3rd Army, 13th, and 21st Armies. The 148th remained in 45th Corps, which also contained the 6th, 121st, and 137th Rifle Divisions. 13th Army was now under command of Maj. Gen. K. D. Golubev. Central Front was intended to cover the junction between Western and Southwestern Fronts while also operating toward Gomel and Babruysk. Concurrent with this, Timoshenko issued an order which read, in part:

Withdraw the remnants of 7th and 17th [Mechanized Corps] and 24th, 137th, 132nd, 148th, and 160th RDs to the Sukhinichi region, and form two [100-series] tank divisions from the mechanized corps. Entrust 4th Army's headquarters with the task of forming the formations [divisions] indicated above.

The 148th, having lost one regiment and most of another, would be rebuilt as best as possible under the circumstances.[11]

Guderian's Roslavl counterattack

In an effort to break through to his pocketed armies at Smolensk, Timoshenko created a shock group from 28th Army named after the Army commander, Lt. Gen. V. Ya. Kachalov. Group Kachalov was to advance toward Pochinok starting on July 23 and consisted of the 145th and 149th Rifle Divisions, 104th Tank Division, and supporting units. The attack made slow progress due to lack of training and experience, as German reinforcements began to arrive. By July 29 it had effectively ground to a halt.[12]

Guderian had been watching events and looking for an opening. In the morning of August 1 the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions began a counterattack aimed at Roslavl with the intention of linking up with IX Army Corps attacking south from Pochinok. Late that day Timoshenko was still chiding Kachalov for his failure and demanding the drive on Pochinok continue, unaware of the danger approaching. The panzers immediately penetrated between the 148th and 8th Rifle Divisions on Kachalov's left flank, then turned east along the Roslavl road, with the 3rd taking up blocking positions on the road from that place to Krychaw, and the 4th moving straight on Roslavl. The left flank of the 222nd Rifle Division was turned, and IX Corps struck southward, threatening both flanks of Group Kachalov with envelopment. This was completed on August 3 and much of Group Kachalov was destroyed.[13]

As Guderian pressed south with his forces a gap was formed between Central and Reserve Fronts. The STAVKA responded on August 14 by forming Bryansk Front under command of Lt. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko. The new Front had just two armies, the 13th and 50th, with the 148th still part of the former. The Front was also expected to take part in Timoshenko's new counteroffensive against Army Group Center. 13th Army was in tatters after being defeated south of the Sozh and was withdrawing to the east with little prospect of making an offensive contribution. The next day Guderian was ordered to continue moving south with XXIV Panzer Corps over his objections, and on August 16 4th Panzer ran into stiff resistance from 13th Army at the Besed River, forcing the commitment of 10th Motorized Division. By August 18, 2nd Panzer Group had forced a salient 115km wide and 120km deep between Bryansk and Central Fronts.[14]

Battles on the Desna

By August 19 the stage was set for an encounter battle Guderian's forces and Bryansk Front. XXXXVII Panzer Corps led with its reconnaissance elements in the direction of Bryansk and Trubchevsk. General Golubev deployed only his most combat-effective units to fortify the routes to those two places in order to provide a base for future counterattacks; this effort began on the afternoon of August 21 despite a lack of information on German positions and intentions. The defensive line was to be some 70km long on either side of Pogar, tying in with 50th Army to the north. In his Order No. 056 of that date the 148th, not being combat effective, was ordered to "withdraw to the Suzemka region [38km south-southeast of Trubchevsk] for resting and refitting." By day's end the two Armies were mostly in sound defenses along the Desna River.[15]

Over the next two days the 17th Panzer Division continued a slow advance on Pochep, threatening to break the Desna line. At 2000 hours on August 23 Yeryomenko tasked 13th Army with the defense of that place. 48 hours later the 21st and 3rd Armies were also incorporated into his Front, and effective midnight on August 28 the 148th was transferred to the latter. This Army was under command of Maj. Gen. Ya. G. Kreizer. By now Hitler had finalized his decision to encircle Southwestern Front in and east of Kyiv, which would require Guderian's forces to drive due south and 4th Army would take over their sector as far south as Pochep. 17th Panzer was to advance through that place and Trubchevsk to guard the left flank of the advance. Pochep fell on the afternoon of August 25, while 3rd Panzer was moving on Novhorod-Siverskyi, where two bridges spanned the Desna. These were defended by the 143rd Rifle Division plus remnants of the 148th; Cherokmanov had ordered his men to construct antitank ditches and dig timbers into the ground on the far bank, covered with fire. The first effort by 6th Panzer Regiment and the motorcycle battalion to rush the bridges failed under concentrated Soviet artillery and mortar fire, plus air attacks. The river's flood plain was over 5km wide here and taking at least one bridge was vital to the German plan.[16]

Overnight the commander of 3rd Panzer, Gen. W. Model, organized a special assault group with anti-demolition training to seize the bridges by coup-de-main, while elements of the 283rd Rifle Division reinforced the bridgehead. As the artillery preparation began, some of the hastily-raised and marginally trained defenders surrendered, while others fought half-heartedly. The armored assault group penetrated into the outskirts of the town and headed for the main bridge under cover of smoke. The raid succeeded in defusing the demolitions on the bridge and it came under German control. Soviet counterattacks, supported by tanks, were unsuccessful. On August 27 the 6th Panzer Regiment was sent on a raid to the south which took more bridges and compromised the line of the Desna.[17]

The STAVKA, still not grasping the significance of Guderian's moves, demanded that Yeryomenko join in on a general counteroffensive by Western and Reserve Fronts set for August 30 and September 1. In his first orders only 13th Army would be involved, but on the morning of August 30 the STAVKA complicated the situation by ordering all of his Front take part. Specifically, the 3rd Army was to:

...attack from the Lipki, Vitovka, and Semtsy front [10-20km south of Pochep] toward Starodub and Novozybkov with at least two RDs with tanks, smash the enemy's mobile grouping in the Starodub, Novgorod-Severskii, and Trubchevsk region, together with 13th Army, and reach the Klimovichi and Belaya Dubrovka front by 15 September.

This was utterly unrealistic given the Front's inadequate forces, and Guderian's presence in their midst. At this time 3rd Army had five rifle divisions in various states of repair, one cavalry division, two tank brigades, and a separate tank battalion. Meanwhile, a 20km-wide gap separated his Front and Central Front's 21st Army. Yeryomenko issued his orders to Kreizer to comply with Moscow's demands, but specified that the 148th was to be filled out with replacements and remain in reserve.[18]

References

Citations

  1. ^ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 73
  2. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, pp. 10, 18
  3. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 74
  4. ^ David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2010, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  5. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 23
  6. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  7. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  8. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  9. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  10. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., chs. 3, 6. At different points in this source the 507th is numbered as the 57th and 307th.
  11. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 4
  12. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 5
  13. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 7
  14. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 8
  15. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, pp. 72-75
  16. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 78-80, 92-95, 106-07
  17. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 107-08
  18. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 371-75, 377, 400

Bibliography

  • Grylev, A. N. (1970). Перечень № 5. Стрелковых, горнострелковых, мотострелковых и моторизованных дивизии, входивших в состав Действующей армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг [List (Perechen) No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motor Rifle and Motorized divisions, part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. p. 72
  • Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1964). Командование корпусного и дивизионного звена советских вооруженных сил периода Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг [Commanders of Corps and Divisions in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Frunze Military Academy. pp. 173-74